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Abstract
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time
units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems asso-
ciated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies.
We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that
selects an individually rational and balanced allocation which maximizes exchanges among the
participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference
domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unac-
ceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable agents have specific upper quotas
representing their maximum needs.
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1 Introduction
This paper considers time exchanges, i.e., markets where agents have initial endowments (that they
wish to exchange with other agents), and there is a central organization overseeing the exchanges.
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Three well-known time exchange markets are (i) the Erasmus program where more than 5,000 Eu-
ropean higher education institutions across 37 countries participate to exchange students for shorter
time periods;1 (ii) the US-based program The Tuition Exchange, Inc. (TTEI) where tuition waivers
can be used by family members of faculty to attend colleges without paying tuition fees (Dur and
Ünver, 2019); and (iii) time banks where groups of individuals and/or organizations set up common
platforms to trade services among themselves (Cahn, 2011). Even if many exchange systems have
been operating for decades, we argue that the absence of a centralized market structure is a source of
inefficiency and that it may lead to “unbalanced” exchanges. These problems will ultimately threaten
the long run sustainability of the exchange market. Given this observation, we propose a centralized
market structure where exchanges are identified using a “priority mechanism” that satisfies a number
of desirable properties on a reduced, yet relevant, preference domain.
As claimed above, there are reasons to believe that these exchange markets often are less effi-
cient than centralized markets. First, centralized and computer-based clearing houses typically have
lower overhead costs than their counterparts above. Second, it is challenging to identify and coor-
dinate longer exchange cycles on “semi-centralized markets.” By centrally organizing exchanges, a
formal matching mechanism can identify and coordinate longer trading cycles based on reported pref-
erences, which will lead to more efficient outcomes. Related to this, it is by no means clear that all
reported information is taken into account when identifying exchanges in those markets, and this may,
consequently, result in undesirable outcomes for the participating agents.
Inefficiencies aside, a well-documented obstacle for the long-term sustainability of time exchange
markets is the fact that the exchanges are not necessarily “balanced.” For example, in the Erasmus and
the TTEI programs, the participating education institutions care about the balance of the incoming and
outgoing students as there are no monetary transfers between participating institutions. Yet, there is
still a documented imbalance in both these programs as described in Dur and Ünver (2019). Similarly,
members of time banks are concerned about “time balance” since they do not wish to provide more
time to the bank than they get back in return. Still, Ozanne (2010) concludes that time bank members
often experience that time credits are comparatively easy to earn but harder to spend, i.e., that most
members run a “time deficit.” The lack of balance may discourage participation in these types of
exchange markets, which ultimately threatens their long-term sustainability.
To overcome some of these problems associated with time exchange markets, this paper proposes
1See www.erasmusprogramme.compostwhat-is-the-erasmus-programme (retrieved September 1, 2019).
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a redesign whereby a central planner identifies exchanges based on a “priority mechanism” (discussed
below). This mechanism identifies an allocation, i.e., a formal description of all exchanges, based on
the information reported by the agents. The identified allocation only contains desirable (individually
rational) exchanges; it is balanced and guarantees a maximal number of exchanges (the latter property
implies efficiency on the considered preference domains). Given the interest in individually rational,
efficient, and balanced allocations, a first observation is that such allocations always exist on the
general preference domain. This follows since the allocation in which there are no exchanges (i.e.,
when all agents keep their initial endowments) is individually rational and satisfies balancedness.
The conclusion then follows directly from the observation that the number of individually rational
and balanced allocations is finite, and, consequently, there exists an allocation among those which is
efficient.
Even if an allocation satisfying the specific properties of interest can be identified, two new prob-
lems arise. First, it is often natural to require that the matching mechanisms should be designed in
such a fashion that it is in the best interest for all agents to report their preferences truthfully (non-
manipulability). This property is incompatible with individual rationality, efficiency, and balancedness
on a general preference domain (Sönmez, 1999, Corollary 1).2 Second, because participating agents
can be involved in multiple exchanges (e.g., education institutions may exchange multiple students,
time bank members may receive services from several distinct members, etc.), it is not clear that it
is easy for agents to generally rank any two distinct allocations. In timebanking, for example, is an
allocation whereby the agent receives two hours of hairdressing, two hours of gardening and one hour
of babysitting strictly better, equally good, or less preferred to an allocation where the agent receives
one hour of hairdressing, one hour of gardening and three hours of housekeeping? Hence, it may be
difficult for agents to report their preferences when they are allowed to be involved in multiple cyclical
exchanges with a number of distinct agents.
We show that, if agent preferences satisfy certain conditions, the above two problems are no longer
present. In some settings, the considered preference domain is clearly unrealistic (e.g., in exchange
problems related to school choice). In other settings, it provides a reasonably good approximation.
Given a few assumptions related to, e.g., monotonicity, the restricted domain only requires that each
agent (a) partitions the other agents into two disjoint subsets containing agents that provide acceptable
and unacceptable goods, and (b) specify an upper “exchange bound” for each acceptable agent. For
2This impossibility should come as no surprise given the results in, e.g., Hurwicz (1972), Green and Laffont (1979),
Roth (1982), Alcalde and Barberà (1994), Barberà and Jackson (1995), or Schummer (1999).
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example, an education institution in the Erasmus program may classify the other participating institu-
tions as either acceptable or unacceptable to send their students to (an agent’s “horizontal” preference),
but also an upper limit on how many students the institution at most wishes to send to each accept-
able institution (an agent’s “vertical” preference). The reduced preference domain facilitates agents’
ability to report their preferences since they need only report the information in (a) and (b). Under all
circumstances, it is most likely much easier to report preferences on this domain than on the general
domain where agents need to report a complete ranking over all possible allocations. The considered
reduced domain is an extension of the dichotomous domain that was popularized by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2004).3
To solve the considered exchange problem, we define a “priority mechanism” and demonstrate
that it can be formulated as a max-weight matching problem (Proposition 1). The definition of the
priority mechanism is flexible since it can be adopted on both the restricted and the general preference
domain. The main result shows that the priority mechanism is non-manipulable on the restricted
preference domain and that it always makes a selection from the set of individually rational, maximal,
and balanced allocations (Theorem 1). To prove this result, a number of novel graph theoretical
techniques are needed. In particular, Appendix B demonstrates an equivalence result between the
max-weight matching problem and a circulation-based maximization problem.4
1.1 Related Literature
Before providing some remarks on the existing market design literature, we note that this is not the
first paper to use graph theoretical tools and, in particular, min-cost/max-weight formulations to solve
matching problems. In the house allocation problem with dichotomous preferences, for example, Aziz
(2018) formalizes a bipartite graph and solves for a max-weight matching. His graph construction is
based on having houses on one side and agents on the other side of the market. This is in contrast to
the approach in this paper, where agents are cloned into copies of themselves. Furthermore, our graph
construction and the solution is more intricate since agents can be involved in multiple exchanges.
Because finding a maximal allocation is more involved in our problem and a potential manipulation
is more complex, graph theoretical tools are used to prove the non-manipulability result. This is not
3See Remark 2 for a discussion. Note also that the dichotomous domain is much smaller than the strict preference
domain, but it is not a subset of the strict domain since indifference relations are allowed in the former but not in the latter
domain.
4The max-weight matching problem is considered in the main part of the paper since it is more intuitive and, moreover,
can be introduced using minimal notation.
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needed in Aziz (2018) because he considers a less complex optimization problem.
The considered exchange market shares many features with some classical markets, previously
considered in the matching literature, including, e.g., housing markets (Scarf and Shapley, 1974; Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez, 1999; Aziz, 2018), organ markets (Roth et al., 2004; Biró et al., 2009; Ergin
et al., 2017), one-to-one matching problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962), and markets for school seats
(Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez, 2003; Kesten and Ünver, 2015). There are, however, substantial differ-
ences between these problems and the one considered in this paper. For example, our model allows
agents to be involved in multiple exchanges. In the school choice problem and the kidney exchange
problem, in contrast, students are allocated at most one school seat, and each patient-donor pair is
involved in at most one kidney exchange, respectively. Furthermore, in many matching problems
including, e.g., the school choice problem and the house allocation problem, agents’ (reported) pref-
erences are typically strict, and indifference relations are consequently not allowed (while the kidney
exchange problem is often defined on a dichotomous domain). Generalizations to allow for a weak
preference structure have recently been proposed by Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo
and Manjunath (2012). However, both these papers only allow agents to trade at most one object.
By organizing the considered type of time exchanges as a matching market, it will have the struc-
ture of a many-to-many matching market. Such markets have previously been considered by, e.g.,
Echenique and Oviedo (2006), Konishi and Ünver (2006), and Hatfield and Kominers (2016). The
papers closest to the model investigated in this study are Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011), Aziz
(2016), Biró et al. (2017a,b) and Manjunath and Westkamp (2019), which we describe next.
Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011) and Aziz (2016) consider a housing market where initial
endowments as well as allocations are described by a vector of fractions of the houses in the economy.
The fractional setting makes it possible to analyze, e.g., efficiency based on (first-order) stochastic
dominance, and it is demonstrated that the efficiency and fairness notions of interest conflict with
non-manipulability. Even if a similar impossibility is present in our model, the fractional setting is
analyzed using different axioms and mechanisms. In addition, Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011)
and Aziz (2016) are unable to find any positive results related to non-manipulability in their considered
reduced preference domains.
Biró et al. (2017a) consider, as does this paper, a model where agents are endowed with multiple
units of an indivisible and agent-specific good, searching for balanced allocations. In their reduced
preference domain, agents have responsive preferences over consumption bundles. In this reduced
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domain, they demonstrate that, for general capacity configurations, no mechanism satisfies individ-
ual rationality, efficiency, and non-manipulability. Given this negative finding, they characterize the
capacity configurations for which individual rationality, efficiency and non-manipulability are com-
patible. They also demonstrate that, for these capacity configurations, their mechanism is the unique
mechanism that satisfies all three properties of interest. Hence, the main difference between this paper
and Biró et al. (2017a) is that they consider a different preference domain and, consequently, need a
different mechanism to escape the impossibility result.
Manjunath and Westkamp (2019) have independently considered a model of shift exchange that
is closely related to the one considered here. In terms of our application to time banks, the model
of Manjunath and Westkamp allows each agent to supply distinct services as opposed to our model
where each agent supplies the same service in multiple units. Like us, Manjunath and Westkamp
require exchange to be balanced and consider a responsive preference domain classifying individual
services as either unacceptable and acceptable. Since agents are allowed to be indifferent between
different services, their model is able to handle multiple copies of the same service. Manjunath and
Westkamp (2019) show that a priority mechanism over the set of all individually rational allocations
is efficient and strategy-proof. The main differences between our work and that of Manjunath and
Westkamp are that (a) their model is more general in that it allows agents to have distinct services
whereas each agent in our model has a specific service that comes in multiple copies, and (b) their
priority mechanism is only guaranteed to be Pareto-efficient while our mechanism satisfies the more
demanding efficiency criterion of maximality (and as we show in Example 3 allocations from the two
mechanisms can indeed be quite different). Finally, (c) for the non-manipulability result our proof
techniques are very different and are complementary.
1.2 Outline of the Paper
The remaining part of the paper is outlined as follows. Because exchange problems related to tuition
exchange and the Erasmus program are well-documented in the matching literature (see, e.g., Biró,
2017; Delacrétaz, 2019; Dur and Kesten, 2018; Dur and Ünver, 2019), Section 2 will introduce a
problem that has received much less attention, namely the timebanking problem. This section gives
a detailed introduction to timebanking and provides some descriptive statistics of the time banks
associated with TimeBanks USA. Section 3 introduces the general theoretical exchange framework
and some basic definitions. Section 4 introduces priority mechanisms. The main results are presented
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in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the main findings of the paper. Finally, Section 7 concludes the
paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Timebanking
Even if concepts closely related to timebanking dates back to the 19th century, timebanking was
popularized and pioneered in the 1990s by Edgar Cahn and Martin Simon in the United States and the
United Kingdom, respectively. However, it took another 20 years before the concept of timebanking
had a serious impact in society. Dash and Sandhu (2018) report that the first time bank in the United
Kingdom was set up in 1996, but only 2,200 persons had joined a time bank by 2003. Eight years
later, after additional experimentation, learning, and expansion, there were around 30,000 registered
members in the United Kingdom, 30,000 registered members in the United States, and an additional
100,000 members scattered across 34 countries (Cahn, 2011). This number has continued to grow. In
2014, there were around 35,000 members in the United Kingdom and even more in the United States.5
As explained in the Introduction, a time bank is a group of individuals and/or organizations in a
local community that set up a common platform to trade services among themselves. For example, a
gardener who supplies two hours of time may, for example, receive two hours of child care in return
for his gardening services. Ozanne (2010) reported that the most commonly exchanged services
included gardening, giving lifts, befriending, do-it-yourself jobs, dog walking, and computer training.
Members of a time bank earn one time credit for each time unit they supply to members of the bank.
The earned credit can be spent to receive services from other members of the bank.6
In most time banks, a broker is employed to manage the bank, maintain the database, record trans-
actions, recruit new members, etc. (Seyfang, 2003, 2004; Williams, 2004). A “matching system” helps
the broker to coordinate requests for services with those who can provide them. In some time banks,
this “system” is simple and the broker manually matches requests with offers (Seyfang, 2003). A few
large time banks, including TimeBanks USA and Timebanking UK, have developed their own com-
puter software where members can see what other members offer and keep track of their own activity.
For example, the software used by TimeBanks USA (called Community Weaver 3) allows members to
register their talents in 11 different categories including, e.g., education, transportation, business ser-
vices, recreation, and companionship. Each of these categories also has subcategories. The category
5These figures are from Boyle and Bird (2014) or www.timebanks.org (retrieved 2019–02–05).
6Very few time banks are not based on a “one-for-one” time system, meaning that members of the time bank need not
get one unit of time back for each unit of time they supply (Croall, 1997).
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“education,” for example, contains subcategories such as advocacy, computers, languages, finances,
and tutoring. When a member has registered her talents, she can start offering her services and begin
making requests. An offer is a formal registration on the online platform that enables other members
to see and request her talents. If a member approves a request, she receives the agreed amount of time
credits and the member who receives the service is credited by the same amount of time credits.
Even if some time banks take advantage of computer software, it is difficult to coordinate longer
trading cycles as members only can see their own activity. As a consequence, time bank members are
naturally restricted to bilateral exchanges. Furthermore, it may be an obstacle for time bank members
to report too “detailed” preferences if they potentially can be involved in multiple exchange cycles.
This is also one of the reasons for considering a reduced preference domain (informally described in
the Introduction and formally defined in Section 3.2) whereby each time bank member partitions the
other members of the bank (or, equivalently, the services they provide) into two disjoint subsets con-
taining acceptable and unacceptable members, and specify an upper time bound for each acceptable
member. The former condition reflects that an agent is not necessarily interested in all services pro-
vided in the bank. The latter condition captures the idea that an agent may, for example, be interested
in at most one haircut but can accept up to 10 hours of babysitting. This preference domain clearly
facilitates time bank members’ ability to report their preferences, and it captures certain aspects of
existing time banks, e.g., that members classify their services in various categories and that members
request certain categories of services.
2.1 Timebanking and Society
The types of services provided by members of time banks, as exemplified above, are typically available
and priced on competitive markets. Given this observation, it is natural to ask: what role do time banks
play in society and what explains the existence of time banks in a society where monetary transfers
are available?
One potential explanation may be the documented fact (Collom, 2007; Seyfang, 2003; Seyfang
and Smith, 2002) that time banks are very successful in attracting participants from socially excluded
groups and low-income communities, e.g., people on benefit programs, from low-income households,
etc.7 That is, because most time bank members have small social networks and, in many cases, also
7Most studies in the existing literature, consequently, focus on socially excluded and low-income groups. An exception
is Ozanne (2010) where it is demonstrated that time banks have provided high benefits in the form of social, human, physical
and cultural capital also within affluent groups.
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lack both income and employment, timebanking is one way to be included in a social network and to
increase welfare. Another way of expressing this observation is that persons from socially excluded
groups often have a scarcity of traditional means of payment (i.e., “money”), but can gain access to an
alternative currency by joining a time bank (i.e., “time credits”). This will increase their purchasing
power. In fact, Collom (2007) has documented that the single most important reason for joining a
time bank is to expand purchasing power through an alternative currency.
Another potential explanation is deeply rooted in the philosophy of timebanking. As stated by
one of its proponents Cahn (2000), different fairness and equality notions are embedded in the five
core values of timebanking: assets, redefining work, reciprocity, social networks, and respect. For
example, and as explained above, one of the fundamental ideas in timebanking is that one hour of
service generates one time credit regardless of the provider or the nature of the service performed.
Consequently, even if services provided by time bank members are valued and priced differently on
competitive markets, the timebanking philosophy prescribes that human beings share fundamental
equality and their services should therefore be “priced” equally (through a one-for-one time exchange
system).
Furthermore, an integral part of these core values is to extend social networks, increase informal
neighborhood support, and develop reciprocal relationships (Cahn, 2000). One way to reach these
goals is to provide a marketplace that is “less anonymous” than competitive markets and to more
explicitly set up a market where people can meet physically and exchange services. In fact, Seyfang
(2003) found that persons join time banks to meet other members, to help other members, to get
more involved in the local neighborhood, etc. Similar motives are recorded by, e.g., Collom (2007)
and Caldwell (2000). Related to this, Boyle et al. (2006) showed that time banks not only help their
members to extend their social networks but also that time banks are an effective way of developing
reciprocal relationships between members in the bank.
2.2 Organization and Descriptive Statistics of TimeBanks USA
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no public database that provides detailed statistics about
time banks worldwide. To give the reader at least some idea about, e.g., the size and number of
transactions in a time bank, this section provides some descriptive statistics of TimeBanks USA, the
largest time bank operating in the United States.8 The data are from the period April 1, 2015 (when
8All data and documentation related to TimeBanks USA stated in this section are available in the Online Appendix.
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Community Weaver 3 was launched) to January 15, 2019 (when we collected the data).
TimeBanks USA currently has 107 branches in the United States spread out over 33 states, and it
also operates in Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Guatemala, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa,
South Korea, and the United Kingdom (see Table 1). Even if not all registered branches are active,
Table 2 provides some more detailed information about the active branches. As can be seen from
the table, a time bank located in the United States has on average around 100 members and has,
on average, performed 1,958 trades since April 2015. These trades involved on average 7,736 time
units per branch, meaning that each time exchange was, on average, for 3.95 hours. As also can be
seen from Table 2, the average time bank in the United States had 115.1 registered active offers and
115.5 active requests on January 15, 2019. The figures from Table 2, therefore, roughly translates to
each member, in an active branch, having, on average, had one active offer and one active request on
January 15, 2019.
Table 1: Descriptive data of TimeBanks USA.
Country Number of branches Active branches Represented in states/provinces/regions
USA 107 84 33 out of 50
New Zealand 30 28 7 out of 16
Canada 11 9 5 out of 10
Other countries 8 7 –
∗ The data were collected from www.timebanks.org on 2019–01–15 and are available in the Online Appendix.
Table 2: Mean summary statistics for the active time banks in Table 1.
Country Number of members Number of exchanges Number of hours exchanged Active offers Active requests
USA 98.9 (105.9) 1,957.8 (5,034.9) 7,736.0 (25,509.6) 115.1 (748.9) 115.5 (746.6)
New Zealand 158.7 (189.7) 1,913.4 (2,798.6) 10,568.9 (29,138.0) 25.9 (23.7) 28.2 (28.1)
Canada 64.1 (64.9) 187.1 (255.3) 600.9 (1,019.7) 34.4 (41.6) 27.9 (38.9)
Other countries 113.7 (233.5) 1,464.3 (3,623.4) 5,401.7 (13,694.3) 1.6 (2.1) 2.0 (3.0)
∗ All values are mean values (standard deviation within brackets).
3 The Model and Basic Definitions
This section introduces the exchange problem together with some definitions and axioms.
3.1 Agents, Bundles, and Allocations
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite set of agents. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with ti ∈ N units
of a good (or service) which can be used to exchange goods (or services) with agents in N . One
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can, for example, think of these goods as positions at education institutions, tuition waivers, or time
units. Let t = (t1, . . . , tn) denote the vector of endowments. Because the exact nature of the goods
is of secondary interest, the problem will be described in terms of the number of goods that an agent
receives from and provides to other agents in N . Let xij denote the number of goods that agent i ∈ N
receives from agent j ∈ N , or, equivalently, the number of goods that agent j provides to agent i.
Here, xii represents the number of goods that agent i ∈ N receives from herself. It is assumed that
xij belongs to the set N0 of non-negative integers that includes 0.9
The goods that agent i ∈ N receives from the agents in N can be described by the bundle xi =
(xi1, . . . , xin). The bundle where agent i ∈ N keeps his initial endowment is denoted by ωi (where
ωii = ti and ωij = 0 for j 6= i). An allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) is a collection of n bundles (one for
each agent in N ).
An allocation is feasible if:
n∑
j=1
xij = ti for all i ∈ N, (1)
n∑
j=1
xji = ti for all i ∈ N. (2)
This means any agent i receives the same number of goods from other agents that the agent supplies to
other agents (recall that an agent can keep parts of his initial endowment). In this sense, any feasible
allocation satisfies the balancedness conditions (1) and (2). In the remaining part of the paper, it is
understood that any allocation is feasible. Let F denote the set of all feasible allocations.
3.2 Preferences and Preference Domains
A preference relation for agent i ∈ N is a complete and transitive binary relation Ri over feasible
bundles such that xiRix′i whenever agent i finds bundle xi at least as good as bundle x
′
i. Let Pi
and Ii denote the strict and the indifference part of Ri, respectively. Let Ri denote the set of all
preference relations of agent i ∈ N . A (preference) profile R is a list of individual preferences
R = (R1, . . . , Rn). The general domain of profiles is denoted by R = R1 × · · · × Rn. A profile
R ∈ R may also be written as (Ri, R−i) when the preference relation Ri of agent i ∈ N is of
particular importance.
9In the timebanking application, one can think of xij as a representation of standardized time units, e.g., 0 minutes for
zero units, 30 minutes for one unit, 60 minutes for two units, etc.
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A restricted preference domain R˜ = R˜1 × · · · × R˜n ⊂ R will be considered for our main
results. As explained in the Introduction, this restricted domain is based on the idea that any preference
relation Ri ∈ R˜i:
(a) partitions the set of agents N\{i} into two disjoint sets containing acceptable and unacceptable
agents (i.e., agents that provide acceptable and unacceptable goods), denoted by Ai(Ri) ⊆
N \ {i} and Ui(Ri) = N \ (Ai(Ri) ∪ {i}), respectively, and;
(b) associates with each acceptable agent j ∈ Ai(Ri) an upper bound t¯ij ∈ N0 on the number of
goods that agent i at most would like to receive from agent j.
Here, one may interpret (a) as agent i’s “horizontal preference” over acceptable and unacceptable
agents, and (b) as agent i’s “vertical preference” representing the maximal demand of each good
provided by an acceptable agent. Then, for agent i ∈ N , the preference relation Ri belongs to R˜i if
for any allocations x and y:
(i) ωiPixi if xik > 0 for some k ∈ Ui(Ri) or xij > t¯ij for some j ∈ Ai(Ri),
(ii) xiIiyi if both ωiPixi and ωiPiyi,
(iii) yiPixi if yiRiωi, xiRiωi and
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) yij >
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) xij , or;
(iv) yiIixi if yiRiωi, xiRiωi and
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) yij =
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) xij .
The first condition states that an agent strictly prefers not to be involved in an exchange if (a) the
agent receives goods from unacceptable agents or (b) the number of goods provided by an acceptable
agent exceeds the upper bound. The second condition means that an agent is indifferent between any
two bundles where (a) and/or (b) holds. The last two conditions reflect a monotonicity property and
state that an agent weakly prefers bundles with weakly more acceptable agents whenever bundles do
not contain any unacceptable agents and as long as the bounds t¯ij are not exceeded for the acceptable
agents contained in the bundle.
Remark 1. For the restricted domain R˜, a report Ri for agent i ∈ N is given by a set of acceptable
agentsAi(Ri) together with an upper bound t¯ij for each j ∈ Ai(Ri). An equivalent formulation of the
reported preference for agent i ∈ N is a vector t¯i = (t¯i1, . . . , t¯in) ∈ Nn0 where t¯ii = ti. Then t¯ij = 0
stands for j ∈ Ui(Ri), i.e., agent i is willing to accept at most zero units from agent j. Whether the
first or the second formulation is used is just a matter of choice. 
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Remark 2. For any agent i ∈ N and Ri ∈ R˜i, the preference Ri is dichotomous over single agents
because agents are partitioned into agents that provide acceptable and unacceptable goods. The prefer-
enceRi is polychotomous over bundles in the following way: for any h = 0, 1, . . . ,min{ti,
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) t¯ij} =
m, all allocations x and y such that xij ≤ t¯ij and yij ≤ t¯ij for all j ∈ Ai(Ri), xik = 0 = yik for all
k ∈ Ui(Ri) and
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) yij = h =
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) xij are ranked indifferent by Ri. Let I(h) denote
this indifference class. Then underRi all allocations in I(m) are strictly preferred to all allocations in
I(m− 1), and in general, for h = 1, . . . ,m, under Ri all allocations in I(h) are strictly preferred to
all allocations in I(h− 1). Thus, Ri contains m+ 2 indifference classes (where I(0) = {ωi} and ωi
is strictly preferred to all allocations where the agent receives goods from unacceptable agents or the
number of goods provided by an acceptable agent exceeds the upper bound). In this sense, preferences
belonging to R˜i are polychotomous over bundles (where the upper bounds are incorporated) and at
the same time dichotomous over single agents. 
3.3 Axioms and Mechanisms
Recall that F denotes the set of all feasible allocations. Allocation x ∈ F is individually rational
if, for all i ∈ N , xiRiωi.Allocation x ∈ F Pareto dominates allocation x′ ∈ F if xiRix′i for all
i ∈ N and xjPjx′j for some j ∈ N . An allocation is efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by any
feasible allocation. An allocation x is maximal at R if
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) xij ≥
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) x
′
ij
for all individually rational allocations x′. All individually rational and maximal allocations at profile
R ∈ R˜ are gathered in the set X (R) ⊂ F . Note that X (R) 6= ∅ for all R ∈ R˜ and that any x ∈ X (R)
is efficient.10
A mechanism ϕ with domain R˜ chooses for any profile R ∈ R˜ a feasible allocation ϕ(R) ∈ F .
Mechanism ϕ is manipulable at profile R ∈ R˜ by an agent i ∈ N if there exists R′i such that
R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ R˜, and for x = ϕ(R) and x′ = ϕ(R′) we have x′iPixi. If mechanism ϕ is not
manipulable by any agent i ∈ N at any profile R ∈ R˜, then ϕ is non-manipulable (on the domain R˜).
4 Priority Mechanisms
Any priority mechanism uses a priority-ordering. This ordering may be deduced from a lottery or from
a schematic update based on previous allocation rounds. Let pi : N 7→ N be an exogenously given
10If x is not efficient, then there exists an individually rational allocation x′ such that x′iRixi for all i ∈ N and x′jPjxj
for some j ∈ N . But then ∑i∈N∑j∈Ai(Ri) xij < ∑i∈N∑j∈Ai(Ri) x′ij meaning that x is not maximal, which is a
contradiction.
13
priority-ordering where the highest-ranked agent is i ∈ N with pi(i) = 1, the second-highest-ranked
agent is i′ ∈ N with pi(i′) = 2, and so on.
Given R ∈ R˜, i ∈ N and Z∗ ⊆ X (R), allocation x ∈ Z∗ belongs to the set X i,Z∗(R) if xiRix′i
for all x′ ∈ Z∗, i.e., if allocation x is weakly preferred to any allocation in the setZ∗ under preference
Ri. In the special case where the set Z∗ is based on the choice made by some agent i′ 6= i for some
profile R ∈ R˜, i.e., where Z∗ = X i′,Z∗∗(R) for some Z∗∗ ⊆ X (R), the set X i,Z∗(R) is denoted by
X i,i′(R).
Definition 1. An allocation x ∈ X (R) is agent-i-optimal at profile R ∈ R˜ if x ∈ X i,X (R)(R).
Note the difference between the sets X i,X (R)(R) and X i,Z∗(R). The former set contains all agent i’s
most preferred allocations in the set X (R) whereas the latter set contains all agent i’s most preferred
allocations in a subset Z∗ of X (R).
Definition 2. Let pi be a priority-ordering and N = {i1, . . . , in} be such that pi(ik) = k for all
k = 1, . . . , n. Then x ∈ X (R) is a pi-priority allocation at profile R ∈ R˜ if:
(i) x belongs to X i1,X (R)(R),
(ii) x belongs to X ik,ik−1(R) for all k = 2, . . . , n.
One way to think about the set of priority allocations is the following. First, the highest-ranked agent
identifies all his most preferred allocations in the set X (R). Then, the agent with the second-highest
priority identifies all his most preferred allocations in the set identified by the highest-ranked agent;
then, the agent with the third-highest priority identifies all his most-preferred allocations in the set
identified by the second highest ranked agent, and so on. Formally, this means that, if x is a pi-priority
allocation, then:
x ∈ X in,in−1(R) ⊆ X in−1,in−2(R) ⊆ . . . ⊆ X i2,i1(R) ⊆ X i1,X (R)(R) ⊆ X (R). (3)
Note that a priority allocation is agent-i-optimal for the agent i ∈ N with pi(i) = 1. Moreover, all
agents in N are, by construction, indifferent between all allocations in the set X in,in−1(R).
Definition 3. A mechanism ϕ is a priority mechanism if there exists a priority-ordering pi such that
for all profiles R ∈ R˜ the mechanism ϕ selects a pi-priority allocation from the set X (R).
Since a priority mechanism always makes a selection from the set X (R), it chooses an individually
rational, maximal, and balanced allocation (which is efficient).
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5 Results
As we show in Section 6, it is impossible to construct an individually rational, efficient, and non-
manipulable mechanism on the general domainR. Our first main result demonstrates that this impos-
sibility can be avoided on the restricted domain R˜ if exchanges are based on a priority mechanism.
Theorem 1. Any priority mechanism with domain R˜ is non-manipulable.
In most settings, proving non-manipulability of a priority mechanism is rather straightforward, see,
e.g., Svensson (1994). In our setting with multiple objects and potentially different number of objects,
the scope for manipulation is much larger. The maximal set of allocations changes in a complex
manner if one agent reports something slightly different. A key observation in establishing non-
manipulability of the priority mechanism is that it is enough to ensure that no agent can ever gain by
stating that she wants fewer units from an acceptable agent than she actually desires. This significantly
reduces the possible scope of manipulations.
In order to show that no agent can ever gain by reducing the number of desired copies from an
acceptable agent, we formulate a circulation flow network corresponding to the allocation in the prior-
ity mechanism (see Appendix B for details). This enables us to keep track of changes from potential
manipulations using the circulation formulation. It is straightforward to see that the overall value in
the associated optimization problem will decrease, since the feasible set shrinks. It is, however, a
non-trivial argument to show that also the agent who reduces her capacity will not increase the flow
through her nodes. For details of the argument and the construction of the circulation flow network,
see Appendix B.
In Proposition 1 below, it is demonstrated that a priority mechanism can be formulated as a max-
weight matching problem with vertex and edge capacities. Thereby we know that there exists an effi-
cient way of computing the allocations chosen by the priority mechanism. The max-weight matching
problem is a special case of the well-known network flow problem; thus, it is somewhat easier to
describe than the circulation flow network formulation introduced in Appendix B. To formulate the
max-weight matching problem, a bipartite graph needs to be defined, with edge capacities and vertex
quotas. The edge weights will be introduced later.
Definition 4. For any profile R ∈ R˜, the bipartite graph g = (N,M,E, u, q) is defined by two
disjoint sets of vertices, N and M , a set of edges, E, a profile of capacities u = (u(i, l))(i,l)∈E on
each edge, and a profile of quotas on the vertices q = (q(i))i∈V . These are defined by:
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5 6 7 8
Figure 1: Edge capacity 1 is color-coded by gray, while capacity 2 is denoted by black edges. The
edges connecting two copies of the same agent are marked by dashed lines. The four vertices on the
left have quota 1, while the four vertices on the right have quota 2.
(i) N = {1, . . . , n},
(ii) M = {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n+ n},
(iii) E = {(i, n+ j) ∈ N ×M : j ∈ Ai(Ri) or j = i},
(iv) for all i ∈ N and each edge (i, n + j) ∈ E where j ∈ Ai(Ri) we set u(i, n + j) = t¯ij and
u(i, n+ i) = ti, and;
(v) for all i ∈ N , we set q(i) = ti.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, t1 = t2 = 1 and t3 = t4 = 2. Let R ∈ R˜ be such that
A1(R1) = A2(R2) = {3, 4} (with t¯13 = t¯14 = t¯23 = t¯24 = 1) and A3(R3) = A4(R4) = {1, 2}
(with t¯31 = t¯32 = t¯41 = t¯42 = 2). The constructed graph g is depicted in Figure 1. 
The interpretation of the graph g is that the agents in M should be regarded as copies of the agents
in N and in particular, agent n + i ∈ M is the copy of agent i ∈ N . Furthermore, agents i ∈ N
and n + j ∈ M are connected by an edge if and only if agent j is acceptable for agent i or if j = i.
A matching x specifies for each (i, l) ∈ E a non-negative integer xil ∈ N0. Any matching x is
equivalent to an allocation in the usual sense: xii = xi(n+i), xij = xi(n+j) for all j ∈ Ai(Ri), and
xij = 0 for all j ∈ Ui(Ri). Because an allocation will be defined by the matching values xil on the
edges, our construction guarantees that agent n+ j ∈M can only provide goods to an agent i ∈ N if
agent i finds the good provided by agent j acceptable or if agent j is his own copy. Finally, the upper
bound on the matching value from agent n + j to agent i where j ∈ Ai(Ri) is equal to the upper
bound that represents the number of goods agent i at most would like to receive from agent j.
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Recall that the balancedness conditions (1) and (2) must hold for any allocation. In the language
of matching problems, this means that the required matching value is dictated by equations (1) and
(2) which must be reformulated for the bipartite setting as follows:
∑
j∈Ai(Ri)∪{i}
xi(n+j) = q(i) for all i ∈ N, (1’)
∑
i∈Aj(Rj)∪{i}
xj(n+i) = q(i) for all i ∈ N. (2’)
These conditions are fulfilled by any matching, because they express the perfectness condition in the
matching instance.
A natural interpretation of the bipartite graph is therefore that agents in M supply goods to the
demanding agents in N . To obtain a maximal outcome, it is important to prevent matchings between
agents in N and their own copies in M whenever there are other feasible flows or, equivalently, to
prevent agents from supplying goods to their own copies whenever it is feasible to supply goods to
other distinct agents (by the balancedness conditions, any agent supplying goods to other agents also
receives equally many goods in return from acceptable agents). This can be achieved by introducing
an artificial weight whenever agents supply their own goods to themselves. Let, for this purpose, wil
denote the weight associated when agent l ∈ M supplies goods to agent i, and let, in particular, for
each (i, l) ∈ E:
wil =
 −1 if l = n+ i0 otherwise. (4)
For a given profile R ∈ R˜, a given graph g = (N,M,E, u, q) and given weights w = (wil)(i,l)∈E ,
the (artificial) weight is maximized at any allocation x ∈ F that solves the following maximization
problem:
max
∑
(i,l)∈E
wilxil s.t. conditions (1’), (2’), xil ∈ N0 and xil ≤ u(i, l) for all (i, l) ∈ E. (5)
An allocation x ∈ F is a maximizer if it is a solution of the maximization problem (5). Let V(R,w) ⊆
F denote the set of all maximizers at profileR ∈ R˜ for given weightsw = (wil)(i,l)∈E . For notational
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convenience, the value of an allocation x at weight w is given by V (x,w) =
∑
(i,l)∈E wilxil.
Lemma 1. If allocation x belongs to V(R,w) at profile R ∈ R˜, then x ∈ X (R).
The set of maximizers V(R,w) is non-empty for any profile R ∈ R˜ since V(R,w) ⊆ X (R) and
X (R) is non-empty and finite for all R ∈ R˜. However, as stated above, agents need not be indifferent
between all allocations in the set V(R,w) since V(R,w) ⊆ X (R). Hence, in order to define a priority
mechanism based on a solution to maximization problem (5), a refined selection from the set V(R,w)
is necessary which will be based on the priority-ordering pi.
We will modify the weights w in order to take the priority-ordering pi into account. Let ε0 ∈ (0, 1)
and εi−1 = (1 + ti)εi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By construction of εi, it follows that:11
1 > ε0 ≥ εi >
n∑
k=i+1
tkεk > 0 for all i ∈ {0, . . . n− 1}. (6)
To guarantee a larger allocation to agents with higher priorities, the weight associated with an edge in
the matching instance will be monotonically increasing with higher priorities. More specifically, let
for each (i, l) ∈ E:
w˜il =
 −1 if l = n+ iεpi(i) otherwise.
The above construction means that the agent with the highest priority (i.e., the agent with pi(i) =
1) will receive the highest edge weight (for edges (i, l) ∈ E\{(i, n+ i)}), the agent with the second-
highest priority (i.e., the agent with pi(i) = 2) will receive the second-highest edge weight, and so
on.
Our second main result demonstrates that a mechanism that selects an allocation from the set
of maximizers for each profile in R˜ and any given priority-ordering is a priority mechanism. From
Theorem 1, it is already known that such a mechanism is non-manipulable on the domain R˜.
Proposition 1. For a given priority-ordering pi, a mechanism ϕ selecting for each profile R ∈ R˜ an
allocation from V(R, w˜) is a priority mechanism based on pi.
11To see this, note that εn−1 = (1 + tn)εn > tnεn since εn > 0 and, consequently, εn−2 = (1 + tn−1)εn−1 =
εn−1 + tn−1εn−1 > tnεn + tn−1εn−1. Condition (6) then follows by repeating these arguments.
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6 Discussion and Extensions
This section discusses essentially single-valued cores and random mechanisms under two separate
headings.12 The section also contains a discussion of possible extensions of the model related to, e.g.,
more general preferences and trading networks.
6.1 Essentially Single-Valued Cores
Theorem 1 establishes that, in the considered exchange problem, there exist mechanisms which are
individually rational, efficient, and non-manipulable on the domain R˜. This is surprising as a number
of previous impossibility results for the combination of these axioms have been established by apply-
ing an essentially single-valued cores result by Sönmez (1999). Below, we connect his result to the
considered exchange problem.
GivenR ∈ R˜, the core ofR, denoted by C(R), consists of all feasible allocations x ∈ F which are
not dominated via some coalition and some allocation meaning that there exists no ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and
y ∈ F such that (i) yiRixi for all i ∈ S, (ii) yjPjxj for some j ∈ S and (iii) {j ∈ N : yij 6= 0} ⊆ S
for all i ∈ S. The core of R is essentially single-valued if for all x, y ∈ C(R) we have xiIiyi for all
i ∈ N . Note that, if C(R) = ∅, then the core of R is essentially single-valued.
Let R˜1 denote the set of all profiles R ∈ R˜ such that for all i ∈ N and all j ∈ Ai(Ri) we
have t¯ij = 1 and ti = 1 (i.e., any agent demands at most one unit of any acceptable good, and
any agent supplies at most one unit of their goods). This corresponds to the classical dichotomous
domain by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004). Then it is easy to check that the domain R˜1 satisfies
Assumptions A and B of Sönmez (1999).13 Hence, his main result applies, which shows the following:
if there exists an individually rational, efficient, and non-manipulable mechanism, then for any profile
where the core is non-empty we have (a) the core is essentially single-valued and (b) the mechanism
chooses a core allocation. However, here for any R ∈ R˜1, if the core of R is non-empty, then
the set of individually rational and efficient allocations is essentially single-valued (and the core is
essentially single-valued).14 But then any priority mechanism chooses a core allocation. Note that
12We are grateful to the referees and the Co-Editor for bringing our attention to random mechanisms.
13In our framework (without externalities), Assumption A says that for any allocation x we have xiIiωi if and only if
xi = ωi and Assumption B says that whenever for two allocations x and y with xiPiyi and xiRiωi, there exists a preference
relation R′i such that xiR
′
iωiR
′
iyi.
14Note that for any R ∈ R˜1, if the set of individually rational and efficient allocations is not essentially single-valued,
then any two individually rational and efficient allocations, which are not regarded indifferent by all agents, dominate (via
some coalition) each other and the core must be empty: more formally, for R ∈ R˜ and any two individually rational and
efficient allocations x and y for which not xiIiyi for all i ∈ N , for S = {i ∈ N : xii = 0} we have for all i ∈ S, xiRiyi,
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Proposition 1 of Sönmez (1999) shows that, when the core of each profile is externally stable, then
any selection from the core correspondence is non-manipulable.15 External stability implies that the
core is non-empty for any profile, but here, if the core is non-empty, then the set of individually
rational and efficient allocations is essentially single-valued. As this is often not the case, the core is
often empty and Proposition 1 of Sönmez (1999) cannot be used to show the non-manipulability of
priority mechanisms.
Once non-unitary endowments are allowed, the domain R˜ does not satisfy Assumption B of Sön-
mez (1999). This is illustrated in the next example.
Example 2. We use the instance introduced in Example 1, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, t1 = t2 = 1,
t3 = t4 = 2, and R ∈ R˜ is such that A1(R1) = A2(R2) = {3, 4} (with t¯13 = t¯14 = t¯23 = t¯24 = 1)
and A3(R3) = A4(R4) = {1, 2} (with t¯31 = t¯32 = t¯41 = t¯42 = 2). If agent 3 comes before agent
4 in the priority-order pi, then (3, 3, 12, 0) is the unique pi-priority allocation (where this stands for
agent 1 receiving one unit from agent 3, agent 2 receiving one unit from agent 3, agent 3 receiving
one unit from both agent 1 and agent 2, and agent 4 keeping his endowment). If agent 4 comes
before agent 3 in the priority-order pi, then (4, 4, 0, 12) is the unique pi-priority allocation. Note
that (3, 3, 12, 0)P3(3, 4, 1, 2)P3ω3 but there exists no R′3 such that (3, 3, 12, 0)P ′3ω3P ′3(3, 4, 1, 2).
The latter conclusion follows since (3, 3, 12, 0)P ′3ω3 implies 1 ∈ A3(R′3) and t¯′31 ≥ 1, and thus
(3, 4, 1, 2)P ′3ω3. Hence, Assumption B is violated for the domain R˜ and, at the same time, any prior-
ity mechanism is individually rational, efficient, and non-manipulable. 
The above example also shows that, in general, we do not have dichotomous preferences in the domain
R˜. We may have many distinct indifference classes for preferences in the domain R˜ and yet, by
Theorem 1, there exists an individually rational, efficient, and non-manipulable mechanism.
Finally, it is demonstrated that a priority mechanism with the same order may select different allo-
cations when choosing from the set of individually rational and efficient allocations (as in Manjunath
and Westkamp, 2019).
Example 3. LetN = {1, 2, 3, 4} and t1 = t2 = t3 = t4 = 1. LetR ∈ R˜ be such thatA1(R1) = {2},
A2(R2) = {3}, A3(R3) = {1, 4}, and A4(R4) = {3} (with t¯12 = t¯23 = t¯31 = t¯34 = t¯43 = 1).
Then X (R) = {(2, 3, 1, 0)}, i.e., there is a unique individually rational and maximal allocation which
and for some j ∈ S, xjPjyj , i.e., x dominates y with the coalition S (and the same argument applies for y in the role of x
and x in the role of y). Thus, the core of R is empty.
15See also Demange (1987) for an important study of non-manipulable cores.
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is chosen by any priority mechanism. However, the allocation (0, 0, 4, 3) is individually rational and
efficient which is selected by any priority mechanism which chooses from the whole set of individually
rational and efficient allocations and where agent 4 occupies the first position in the priority-order (and
such a priority mechanism would not necessarily result in a maximal allocation). Note that the same
argument applies if a priority mechanism chooses from the set of all feasible allocations. 
6.2 Random Mechanisms
Priority mechanisms are unfair in the sense that the agent in the first position of the priority-ordering
receives, for any profile R, his most-preferred bundle among all allocations in X (R) (but this is not
the case for the agent in last position of the priority-ordering). To establish fairness, one may consider
random allocations and random mechanisms, which we define briefly below.
A random allocation for R is a probability distribution p over F . For all x ∈ F , let p(x) denote
the probability of allocation x. The support of p is given by the allocations which are chosen with
positive probability by p, i.e. supp(p) = {x ∈ F : p(x) > 0}. Then p is ex-post individually rational
for R if for all x ∈ supp(p), x is individually rational. Analogously, ex-post maximality and ex-post
efficiency are defined. For two random allocations p and q, we say that p stochastically Ri-dominates
q (where we write equivalently pi stochasticallyRi-dominates qi), denoted by piRsdi qi, if for all y ∈ F
we have:
∑
x∈F :xiRiyi
p(x) ≥
∑
x∈F :xiRiyi
q(x).
Then piP sdi qi if piR
sd
i qi and not qiR
sd
i pi. A random mechanism φ chooses for any profile R ∈ R˜ a
random allocation for R. The random mechanism φ is ex-post individually rational if, for any profile
R, the random allocation is ex-post individually rational for R. Analogously, ex-post maximality and
ex-post efficiency are defined for random mechanisms.
Let now ϕpi denote a deterministic priority mechanism using pi as a priority-ordering and Π denote
the set of all priority-orderings. Then let RP =
∑
pi∈Π
1
n!ϕ
pi denote the random priority mechanism
putting equal priority on each priority-ordering. Because deterministic priority mechanisms are in-
dividually rational, maximal and efficient, the random priority mechanism is ex-post individually
rational, ex-post maximal and ex-post efficient.
For random mechanisms, axioms are often defined in terms of stochastic dominance. The random
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mechanism is sd-non-manipulable if, for all R,R′ ∈ R˜ such that R′ = (R′i, R−i) for some i ∈ N ,
we have φi(R)Rsdi φi(R
′). The random mechanism is sd-efficient if, for all R ∈ R˜, there exists no
random allocation p for R such that piRsdi φi(R) for all i ∈ N and pjP sdi φj(R) for some j ∈ N .
For a random allocation p and agent j, let [pj ]−jj denote the probabilities which pj induces on
any xjl ∈ N0 with j 6= l. This takes into account that we only consider individual rational allocations,
since all probabilities in [pj ]−jj are zero for allocations involving agent j sending a service to herself.
The random mechanism is sd-fair (subject to individual rationality) if for all R ∈ R˜ and all i, j ∈ N ,
φi(R)R
sd
i [φj(R)]
−jj .
Now, from our results we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The random priority mechanism is sd-non-manipulable, sd-efficient and sd-fair.
In Corollary 1, sd-non-manipulability and sd-fairness are quite obvious, whereas sd-efficiency is more
surprising and relies on the fact that preferences are dichotomous over single agents (see also Bogo-
molnaia and Moulin, 2004).16 Besides random priority mechanisms, it would be interesting whether
there are any other “nice” random mechanisms which are not simply a mixing of deterministic mech-
anisms. This question is left for future research.
6.3 Extensions
This section contains discusses three possible extensions of the considered model.17
6.3.1 More General Preferences
One may argue that the upper bounds on how many units of the good agent i at most would like to
receive from agent j is extreme in the following sense. Suppose that there are two agents, called 1
and 2, such that t1 = t2 = 3. Now, if for profile R we have t¯12 = 2, then (22, 11)P1w1P1(222, 111)
meaning that agent 1 would strictly prefer his endowment to receiving three units of the good from
agent 2. One may argue that agent 1 has a preference such that (22, 11)P1(222, 111)P1w1, i.e.,
receiving two units of the good from agent 2 is optimal, but receiving three units is still better than his
endowment. This would correspond to agent 1 having a “peak” at two units and a maximum at three
units.
16This is not true in general. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that ex-post efficiency (or ex-post maximality) on
the strict domain does not imply sd-efficiency when agents have unitary endowments.
17We thank the referees and the Co-Editor for suggesting these extensions.
22
It is easy to see that including such preferences would result in a manipulable mechanism (if the
mechanism is efficient and individually rational). Suppose, for instance, that agent 2 has the following
preference (222, 111)P2(22, 11)P2w2. Then x = (222, 111) and x′ = (22, 11) are the two individual
rational and efficient allocations at the preference profile (P1, P2). Thus, any mechanism that chooses
an individual rational and efficient allocation must choose either x or x′. Suppose now that allocation
x is chosen. Then agent 1 can report P ′1 as (22, 11)P ′1w1P ′1(222, 111) and the mechanism must choose
allocation x′, since this is the only individual rational and efficient allocation at (P ′1, P2). This is a
successful manipulation by agent 1. A symmetric argument, where agent 2 can manipulate, can be
made if allocation x′ is chosen. This impossibility is not surprising; see, for instance Konishi et al.
(2001) where agents are endowed with multiple types of indivisible goods and have more general
preferences.
Another possibility is that agents possess more general preferences but are only allowed to report
profiles belonging to R˜ to the priority mechanism. Then non-manipulability becomes meaningless
as agents cannot report their true preferences and one would have to consider games induced by the
mechanism and the general preferences. For instance, if all agents report that no goods are acceptable,
then this is a Nash equilibrium outcome which is in general neither efficient nor maximal for the true
preferences.
6.3.2 Non-Integer Endowments and Upper Bounds
Our analysis can easily accommodate endowments and upper bounds given by rational numbers.
Without going into detail, for any profile R (where for any i ∈ N , ti and t¯ij are rational numbers),
let d denote the greatest common denominator of all constraints. Then, for the profile R in terms of
unit d, agent i is endowed with dti units of his own good, and dt¯ij represents agent i’s upper bound
for goods from agent j. Our construction applies to the profile R in terms of unit d to obtain a priority
allocation which is individually rational and maximal. For non-manipulability, for two profiles R
and R′, let R be in terms of unit d and R′ in terms of unit d′. However, we can then express R
in terms of unit dd′ and the priority allocation for R in terms of unit d is also a priority allocation
in terms of unit dd′. Similarly, we can express R′ in terms of unit dd′, and the priority allocation
for R′ is also a priority allocation in terms of unit dd′. Because the same priority ordering is used,
non-manipulability follows from Theorem 1. Moreover, the algorithm computing a maximum weight
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circulation is strongly polynomial (Orlin, 1993); thus, the running time does not depend on d or d′.18
6.3.3 Embedding in Trading Networks
It is next demonstrated that our model can be embedded in the general framework of trading networks
by Kominers et al. (2020).
In any allocation x, for any i, j ∈ N , the number xij can be viewed as a contract between agent
i and agent j, where agent j provides xij units of his own good to agent i. For later purposes, the
number xij is decomposed into separate units 1ij , 2ij , . . . , xij where kij stands for the kth unit of the
good provided by agent j to agent i. Then agent i is the buyer in contract kij and agent j is the seller
in contract kij . We write i = b(kij) and j = s(kij). Prices are ignored and are all implicitly set to
one. The set of all contracts is denoted by:
Y = {kij : i, j ∈ N with i 6= j and k ∈ {1, . . . , tj}}.
An allocation is then simply a subset of contracts Y ⊆ Y . Let Y→i = {y ∈ Y : b(y) = i} denote the
set of contracts in Y where agent i is a buyer and Yi→ = {y ∈ Y : s(y) = i} the set of contracts in Y
where agent i is a seller. Let Yij = Y→i ∩ Yj→ denote the set of contracts in Y where agent i is the
buyer and agent j is the seller. Let Yi = Y→i ∪ Yi→. A set of contracts Y is feasible if:
(i) for all i ∈ N , |Y→i| = |Yi→| ≤ ti,
(ii) for all i, j ∈ N , if kij ∈ Y and k > 1, then (k − 1)ij ∈ Y , and;
(iii) for all i, j ∈ N , if kji ∈ Y and k > 1, then (k − 1)ji ∈ Y .
Note that condition (i) corresponds to equations (1) and (2), and condition (ii) says that if agent j
provides to agent i the kth unit of the good, then agent j provides to agent i the k − 1th unit of the
good (and similarly for condition (iii)). We say that Yi is feasible for agent i if (i), (ii) and (iii) hold
for agent i. Note that any feasible allocation Y corresponds to an allocation y in the original model
by setting for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, yij = |Yij | and yii = ti − |Yi→| (and vice versa as above).
Given profile R ∈ R˜, agent i’s utility function over subsets of contracts Y ⊆ Yi which are
feasible for agent i is given by (i) Ui(Y ) = |Yi→| if Yij = ∅ for all j ∈ Ui(Ri) and |Yij | ≤ t¯ij for
18We leave the incorporation of irrational constraints for future research.
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all j ∈ A(Ri), and (ii) Ui(Y ) = −∞ otherwise. Then an allocation Y is feasible if for all i ∈ N ,
Ui(Y ) 6= −∞. Note that Ui(∅) = 0.
Then agent i’s choice correspondence for subsets of contracts is defined as follows. For all Y ⊆
Yi, let:
Ci(Y ) = {X ⊆ Y : X is feasible for i and Ui(X) ≥ Ui(X ′) for all X ′ ⊆ Y feasible for i}.
We then write for Y ⊆ Y , Ci(Y ) = Ci(Yi).
Then allocation Y is individually rational if for all i ∈ N , Yi ∈ Ci(Y ). The allocation Y is
maximal if Y is individually rational and there exists no other individually rational allocation W such
that
∑
i∈N Ui(W ) >
∑
i∈N Ui(Y ). Then allocation Y is stable if Y is individually rational and there
exists no Z ⊆ Y\Y such that for all i ∈ N(Z) = {i ∈ N : Zi 6= ∅} and all W ∈ Ci(Y ∪ Z),
Zi ⊆Wi.
Corollary 2. If Y is individually rational and maximal, then Y is stable.
Thus, our results establish that there exists a stable and non-manipulable mechanism. Again, this is
surprising as there often does not exist any stable and non-manipulable mechanism.
Below, we verify that agents’ preferences satisfy monotone substitutability. Hence, by Theorem
1 of Kominers et al. (2020), stability is equivalent to “chain stability.” Moreover, one may verify in
Example 3 that (0, 0, 4, 3) is stable, and the set of individually rational and maximal allocations is in
general a strict subset of the set of stable allocations.
Then agent i’s choice function is monotone substitutable if (1) for all Y,Z ⊆ Yi such that Yi→ =
Zi→ and Y→i ⊆ Z→i, for every Y ∗ ∈ Ci(Y ) there exists Z∗ ∈ Ci(Z) such that (i) Y ∗i→ ⊆ Z∗i→,
(ii) (Y→i\Y ∗→i) ⊆ (Z→i\Z∗→i), and (iii) |Z∗→i| − |Z∗i→| ≥ |Y ∗→i| − |Y ∗i→|; and (2) for all Y,Z ⊆ Yi
such that Y→i = Z→i and Yi→ ⊆ Zi→, for every Y ∗ ∈ Ci(Y ) there exists Z∗ ∈ Ci(Z) such that (i)
Y ∗→i ⊆ Z∗→i, (ii) (Yi→\Y ∗i→) ⊆ (Zi→\Z∗i→), and (iii) |Z∗i→| − |Z∗→i| ≥ |Y ∗i→| − |Y ∗→i|.
Lemma 2. For all i ∈ N and all R ∈ R˜, agent i’s choice function Ci is monotone substitutable.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has modeled time exchanges as matching markets. On a restricted, yet natural prefer-
ence domain, it has been demonstrated that a priority mechanism can be formulated as a max-weight
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matching problem and, furthermore, that such a mechanism is non-manipulable and always makes a
selection from the set of individually rational, efficient, and balanced allocations. No mechanism with
these properties exists in the general preference domain (Sönmez, 1999, Corollary 1).
Even if the considered priority mechanism has been demonstrated to satisfy all properties of inter-
est on a restricted preference domain, the mechanism can be criticized from a fairness perspective as it
discriminates low-priority agents (see the discussion in Section 6.2). For this reason, it is important to
characterize the entire class of mechanisms that satisfies the axioms of interest to see if such discrim-
ination can be avoided or not. Moreover, even though the considered domain restriction is natural for
many time exchanges, it may also be of importance to find a maximal domain result where the above
mentioned impossibility can be escaped. Both these open problems are left for future research.
Finally, we would again like to point out that, even if the timebanking problem was introduced
in Section 2, all results stated in this paper can be adopted on other types of time exchanges. Conse-
quently, the proposed mechanism is not restricted to the timebanking application (see also the Intro-
duction for additional examples).19
Appendix A: Proofs
Appendix A contains the proofs of all results except Theorem 1, which is in Appendix B.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that allocation x belongs to V(R,w). The fact that x is feasible and
individually rational follows directly from the construction of the graph g = (N,M,E, u, q) and by
definition of the maximization problem (5), i.e., agent n+ j ∈M is only connected to an agent i ∈ N
if agent j ∈ Ai(Ri) ∪ {i}, non-zero matching values are between connected agents and the matching
value never exceeds the upper bounds t¯ij on any edge (i, n+ j) ∈ E.
To show that allocation x is maximal, it will be demonstrated that x minimizes the total matching
19Another problem that recently has been solved, using a version of the priority mechanism proposed in this paper, is
the “seminar exchange problem.” This problem was initiated in Scandinavia in the fall of 2018 (by one of the authors of
this paper) to help final year PhD students to practice their job market talks at external departments. To solve this problem,
Economics departments classified 11 different research field as acceptable and unacceptable. Job market candidates, on
the other hand, classified themselves by one of the 11 different research fields and all departments as either acceptable or
unacceptable. A specific construction guaranteed that the job market candidates also played the role of their departments
and could, therefore, be engaged in time-balanced seminar exchanges with other students. The specific construction made
it possible to apply our model and mechanism in this setting, due to limited space we will not explain further details but are
happy to answer any questions and provide further details via email. In total, 10 departments and 21 job market candidates
from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden participated in the centralized market for seminar exchange. In the end, all candidates
were matched to some department in a balanced sense (i.e., each department organized exactly as many seminars as their
own students were invited to).
All details of the seminar exchange market are described at the Swedish Economics blog Ekonomistas. See
https://ekonomistas.se/2018/12/03/en-skandinavisk-matchningsmarknad-for-doktorandseminarier/.
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value between agents i ∈ N and their respective clones i + n ∈ M . Because x ∈ V(R,w) is a
maximizer, it follows that:
∑
(i,l)∈E
wilxil ≥
∑
(i,l)∈E
wilx
′
il for any feasible allocation x
′ in program (5). (7)
Given the construction of the costs in condition (4), it now follows from condition (7) that:
n∑
i=1
wi(n+i)xi(n+i) ≥
n∑
i=1
wi(n+i)x
′
i(n+i).
Because wi(i+n) = −1 for all i ∈ N , by condition (4), the above inequality can be rewritten as:
n∑
i=1
x′i(n+i) ≥
n∑
i=1
xi(n+i).
But this condition means that allocation x minimizes the total matching value between agents i ∈ N
and their respective clones i+n ∈M among all feasible allocations, which is the desired conclusion.

Proof of Proposition 1. It is first demonstrated that V(R, w˜) ⊆ V(R,w) for each profile R ∈ R˜.
Suppose now that x ∈ V(R,w) but x′ /∈ V(R,w) for some x′ that is feasible in the optimization
program defined in (5). To reach the conclusion, it is sufficient to show x′ /∈ V(R, w˜).
Note that x ∈ V(R,w) and x′ /∈ V(R,w) imply V (x,w) > V (x′, w). This conclusion together
with wil ∈ {−1, 0} and xil ∈ N0 for all (i, l) ∈ E and ε0 < 1 gives V (x,w) > V (x′, w) + ε0.
Because w˜il ≥ wil for all (i, l) ∈ E by construction, it holds that V (x, w˜) ≥ V (x,w). This, together
with the above inequalities, imply V (x, w˜) > V (x′, w) + ε0. To complete this part of the proof, we
show that V (x′, w) + ε0 ≥ V (x′, w˜), since this condition together with the above conclusions then
show V (x, w˜) > V (x′, w˜), i.e., that x′ /∈ V(R, w˜).
To demonstrate V (x′, w) + ε0 ≥ V (x′, w˜), we partition E into two disjoint sets, E1 and E2,
where the former set contains all edges (i, l) in E where l 6= i + n and the latter contains all edges
(i, l) in E where l = i+n. Consequently, wil = 0 < w˜il = εi for all (i, l) ∈ E1 and wil = w˜il = −1
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for all (i, l) ∈ E2. Hence, the inequality V (x′, w) + ε0 ≥ V (x′, w˜) can be rewritten as:
V (x′, w) + ε0 =
∑
(i,l)∈E
wilx
′
il + ε0,
=
∑
(i,l)∈E1
wilx
′
il +
∑
(i,l)∈E2
wilx
′
il + ε0,
=
∑
(i,l)∈E2
w˜ilx
′
il + ε0,
≥
∑
(i,l)∈E
w˜ilx
′
il
=
∑
(i,l)∈E1
w˜ilx
′
il +
∑
(i,l)∈E2
w˜ilx
′
il,
=
∑
(i,l)∈E1
εix
′
il +
∑
(i,l)∈E2
w˜ilx
′
il,
= V (x′, w˜).
or, equivalently, as:
ε0 ≥
∑
(i,l)∈E1
εix
′
il. (8)
Conditions (6) and (1’) together with the fact that εixil ≥ 0 for all (i, l) ∈ N ×M now give:
ε0 >
∑
i∈N
εiti ≥
∑
(i,l)∈E1
εix
′
il.
But then condition (8) must hold. Hence, V(R, w˜) ⊆ V(R,w). Thus, by Lemma 1 ϕ(R) ∈ X (R).
To conclude the proof, it needs only to be demonstrated that ϕ is a priority mechanism. But
this follows directly from the construction of the weights εi. To see this, recall from condition (6)
that εi >
∑n
k=i+1 tkεk for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}. Hence, assigning one additional unit to agent
i in maximization problem (5) is strictly preferred to assigning tj units to each agent j ∈ N with
pi(i) < pi(j). Thus, V(R, w˜) is a selection from V(R,w) ⊆ X (R) that first maximizes the number of
goods that agent i1 ∈ N with pi(i1) = 1 receives from acceptable agents (i.e., a selection from the set
Z i1,V(R,w)(R)), and then maximizes the number of goods that agent i2 ∈ N with pi(i1) = 2 receives
from acceptable agents (i.e., a selection from the set Z i2,i1(R)), and so on. This is the definition of a
priority mechanism. 
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Proof of Corollary 1. Because any deterministic priority mechanism ϕpi is non-manipulable, for all
R,R′ ∈ R˜ such thatR′ = (R′i, R−i) for some i ∈ N , we have ϕpii (R)Riϕpii (R′). But then the random
priority mechanism is sd-non-manipulable.
For sd-efficiency, note that φ(R) is ex-post maximal, and, for all x, y ∈ supp(φ(R)), we have:
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ai(Ri)
xij =
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ai(Ri)
yij ≡ m.
Now, if for some random allocation p for R we have piRsdi φi(R) for all i ∈ N and pjP sdi φj(R) for
some j ∈ N , then p is ex-post individually rational. But then it follows that:
∑
i∈N
∑
x∈supp(p)
∑
j∈Ai(Ri)
xij > m.
But then there must exist y ∈ supp(p) such that∑i∈N∑j∈Ai(Ri) yij > m, which is a contradiction
to ex-post maximality of φ(R). Thus, φ is sd-efficient.
For sd-fairness, note that for any i, j ∈ N , the probability that i occupies the first position in a
priority-ordering is equal to the probability that j occupies the first position in a priority-ordering.
Similarly, for any l ∈ N\{i, j}, the probability that i occupies the second position after l in a priority-
ordering is equal to the probability that j occupies the second position after l in a priority-ordering,
and so on. But then it follows that the random priority mechanism is sd-fair. 
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose that Y is not stable. As Y is individually rational, there exists
Z ⊆ Y\Y such that for all i ∈ N(Z) = {i ∈ N : Zi 6= ∅} and all W ∈ Ci(Y ∪ Z), Zi ⊆ Wi. But
then for all i ∈ N(Z), Yi /∈ Ci(Y ∪ Z) and Ui(Y ∪ Z) > Ui(Y ). Thus, Z 6= ∅. Let Zˆ = {kij ∈ Z :
(k − 1)ij /∈ Z}. Thus, Zˆ collects the “additional” goods provided in Z compared to Y .
Because Z 6= ∅ and Z ∩ Y = ∅, we have Zˆ 6= ∅. Thus, there exist i, j ∈ N(Z) such that i 6= j
and kij ∈ Zˆ. If Zˆ→j = ∅, then Z→j = ∅ and Yi ∈ Ci(Y ∪ Z) (as j does not get additional goods in
Z), a contradiction. Thus, Zˆ→j 6= ∅ and hjl ∈ Zˆ for some l ∈ N(Z), and so on. But then we must
a find a cycle i1, . . . , im such that k1i1i2 ∈ Zˆ, . . . , kmimi1 ∈ Zˆ. But now Y ∪ {k1i1i2 , . . . , kmimi1} is a
feasible and individually rational allocation, a contradiction to the maximality of Y . 
Proof of Lemma 2. We only show that condition (1) holds and remark that condition (2) can be
shown similarly. Let Y,Z ⊆ Yi be such that Yi→ = Zi→ and Y→i ⊆ Z→i. Let Y ∗ ∈ Ci(Y ). Then
(iii) is trivially satisfied as |Y ∗→i| − |Y ∗i→| = 0 = |Z∗→i| − |Z∗i→| for all Z∗ ∈ Ci(Z).
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If for some Z∗ ∈ Ci(Z), Ui(Y ∗) = Ui(Z∗), then Y ∗ ∈ Ci(Z) and (i) and (ii) hold trivially.
Otherwise, for some Z∗ ∈ Ci(Z), Ui(Y ∗) < Ui(Z∗). But then choose Ui(Z∗) − Ui(Y ∗) contracts
from Z∗\Y ∗, say the set Zˆ, such that |Zˆ→i| = |Zˆi→|, kij ∈ Zˆ with k > 1 implies (k−1)ij ∈ Zˆ∪Y ∗,
and kji ∈ Zˆ with k > 1 implies (k − 1)ji ∈ Zˆ ∪ Y ∗. Then we obtain Y ∗ ∪ Zˆ ∈ Ci(Z) (because
Ui(Y
∗ ∪ Zˆ) = Ui(Z∗)), and (i), (ii) and (iii) holds for Y ∗ and Y ∗ ∪ Zˆ. 
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
This Appendix first introduces a graph theoretical tool, referred to as the circulation-based model
(Appendix B.1). It will then be demonstrated that the graph formulation in the circulation-based
model, without loss of generality, can replace the min-cost flow problem when analyzing the priority
mechanism (Appendix B.2). These insights enable us to prove that the flow does not increase when a
capacity is reduced on an arc in the graph of the circulation-based model. This is the key step in the
proof of Theorem 1 (Appendix B.3).
Appendix B.1: The Circulation-Based Model
Let Z denote the set containing all integers. For any profile R ∈ R˜, construct a weighted directed
graph DR = (V,A) with capacities c : A 7→ N0 and weights w : A 7→ Z on its arcs. For ease of
notation, we write D instead of DR whenever the profile R is unambiguous. Each agent i ∈ N is
represented by two vertices, denoted by iin and iout. These 2n vertices build the vertex set V of the
graphD. We draw a directed arc between each pair of type (iin, iout), pointing to iout and refer to this
arc as the inner arc of agent i ∈ N . The inner arc has capacity c(iin, iout) = ti. If agent i finds agent
j acceptable, then (jout, iin) belongs to the (directed) arc set A of the graph D. Any such arc is called
regular and has capacity c(jout, iin) = t¯ij , i.e., the upper bound on the number of goods that agent i
would like to receive from agent j. Note also that the vertices of type iin have incoming regular arcs
and a single outgoing inner arc, while vertices of type iout have outgoing regular arcs and a single
incoming inner arc. We define in Appendix B.2 the weights w : A 7→ Z using a priority-order. An
instance of the model is illustrated in Figure 2 (the figure contains some concepts which are explained
later in the Appendix).
Definition 5. A circulation is a function C : A 7→ N0 where:
(i) C(u, v) ≤ c(u, v) for every (u, v) ∈ A,
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(ii)
∑
(u,v)∈AC(u, v) =
∑
(v,w)∈AC(v, w) for every vertex v ∈ V .
Condition (i) is a capacity constraint which ensures that agents do not supply goods beyond their
endowment ti = c(iin, iout), and that the upper bound t¯ij is not exceeded. Condition (ii) is the
classical flow conservation rule, stating that the total flow of the incoming arcs of a vertex equals the
total flow of the outgoing arcs, i.e., that an agent supplies and receives the same number of goods.
The latter condition can also be formulated as:
C(iin, iout) =
∑
(jout,iin)∈A
C(jout, iin) =
∑
(iout,kin)∈A
C(iout, kin) for every agent i ∈ N .
Note that a circulation is by definition a network flow. We call C(iin, iout) the flow value at agent i.
Circulations in a graphD are in one-to-one correspondence with allocations in the exchange problem,
e.g., for an allocation x the corresponding flow value of the inner arc at agent i isC(iin, iout) = ti−xii
and the flow value of any regular arc at agent i isC(jout, iin) = xij for all j ∈ N . The allocation value
for agent i is defined as ti− xii. Another way of expressing this is that the allocation value ti− xii of
agent i in the exchange problem equals the flow value C(iin, iout) at agent i in the circulation model.
Appendix B.2: Replacement Result
This section demonstrates that by placing appropriate weights on the arcs in the graph D, the max-
imum weight circulations correspond to the outcome of the min-cost flow problem used in Sec-
tion 5 to identify the outcome of the priority mechanism (Proposition 2). This result implies that
the circulation-based model can be adopted in the proof of Theorem 1. We remark that both max-
imum weight circulations and min-cost flows can be computed efficiently, or more precisely, in
O(|E|2 log |V |) time in a graph with |V | vertices and |E| arcs , which is strongly polynomial time (Or-
lin, 1993).
Let pi be a priority-ordering. Let tmax be the largest endowment of any agent in N , and define the
weight w(u, v) on each arc (u, v) in the directed graph D = (V,A) by:
w(u, v) =
 t
2(n+1−pi(i))
max if (u, v) = (iin, iout),
0 otherwise.
(9)
We now illustrate our transformation from the priority mechanism to the circulation-based model by
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means of a simple example.
Example 4. Agents are denoted by i, j, k and l. The upper bounds on the acceptable goods are as
follows: t¯ki = 1, t¯ji = 2, t¯kj = 2, t¯lj = 1, t¯ik = 3, t¯il = 1, t¯jl = 3. All other upper bounds are set
to 0. Each agent has an endowment of 3, and their priority-order is alphabetic.
In the circulation-based model, there are two vertex copies to each agent, connected by an inner
arc. The number of goods that each agent is willing to accept from another agent translates into an
upper capacity on the regular arc connecting the out-vertex of the provider and the in-vertex of the
receiver. In Figure 2, inner arcs are marked by horizontal lines, while regular arcs are bent and colored.
Arc weights and capacities are written above and below each arc, respectively. Due to the alphabetic
priority-order and tmax being 3 units, the arc weights of agents i, j, k and l on the inner arcs are given
by 38, 36, 34 and 32, respectively. All arc weights on regular arcs are set to zero.
The max weight circulation in the network can be computed efficiently, and it has weight 3 · 38 +
3 · 36 + 3 · 34 + 1 · 32. It saturates all edges except the dotted (lout, iin) which is left empty, and the
dashed (lout, jout) and (lin, iout), both of which carry one unit of flow. More precisely, agent i sends
2 units of his good to agent j and 1 unit of his good to agent k, agent j sends 2 units of his good to
agent k and 1 unit of his good to agent l, agent k sends 3 units of his good to agent i, and agent l sends
1 unit of his good to agent j. 
iin iout j
in jout kin kout lin lout
3
38
3
36
3
34
3
32
2
0
2
0
1
0
3
0
1
0
1
0
3
0
Figure 2: The circulation-based model for the instance in Example 4.
Let w(C) denote the weighted sum of flow values of the agents in N at circulation C, i.e., w(C) =∑
i∈N C(i
in, iout) · w(iin, iout).
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Proposition 2. For any given profile R ∈ R˜, let C be a maximum weight circulation where the
weights are defined by condition (9). Let C ′ be the circulation corresponding to an allocation x′
selected for R by a priority mechanism ϕ based on pi. Then C ′(iin, iout) = C(iin, iout) for each
i ∈ N .
Proof. As in the statement of the proposition, let C be a maximum weight circulation and let C ′ be
the circulation corresponding to an allocation x′ selected by a priority mechanism. Suppose, to obtain
a contradiction, that C ′(jin, jout) 6= C(jin, jout) for some j ∈ N . Let agent i be the agent with the
highest priority in pi where this holds. Suppose also, without loss of generality, that pi(k) = k for all
k ∈ N . To reach the desired contradiction, we consider two cases.
Case (i): C ′(iin, iout) < C(iin, iout). In this case, the maximum weight circulation C assigns
a higher allocation value to agent i than the priority mechanism. We show by induction that this
contradicts the rules of the priority mechanism. Suppose first that agent i is the highest-ranked agent
according to the priority-order pi and recall that the priority mechanism, by construction, restricts
the set of maximal allocations to those that maximize the allocation value of i (see condition (3)
in Section 4). Thus, there is no allocation that assigns agent i a higher allocation value than the
allocations in this chosen set, and, consequently, no circulation that assigns agent i a higher value.
Hence, agent i cannot be the agent with the highest priority. Suppose now that agent i is the second-
highest-ranked agent according to the priority-order pi. Again, by condition (3) this agent restricts the
set of allocations further. And so, the maximum weight circulation C is still in the chosen set when
agent i restricts the set of allocations further, and it can, consequently, not have a higher allocation
value for agent i than C ′. This argument can be repeated inductively to reach the conclusion that it
cannot be the case that C ′(iin, iout) < C(iin, iout).
Case (ii): C ′(iin, iout) > C(iin, iout). Note first that both C and C ′ are feasible circulations at
profileR. Because agent i is the agent with the highest priority in pi whereC ′(iin, iout) 6= C(iin, iout),
by assumption, it follows that C ′(kin, kout) = C(kin, kout) for all agents k = 1, . . . , i − 1. It will
be demonstrated that agents i+ 1, . . . , n cannot make up for the loss C suffered on arc (iin, iout) and
thus C cannot be of maximum weight since C ′ is a feasible circulation at profile R. Recall first that
the set N0 contains only positive integers, so the difference between C ′(iin, iout) and C(iin, iout) is at
least 1. By construction of the weights on the inner arcs, defined by condition (9), it then follows that:
[C ′(iin, iout)− C(iin, iout)] · t2(n−i+1)max ≥ t2(n−i+1)max . (10)
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Note next that, in the extreme case, all agents with lower priorities than agent i have flow value zero
in C ′ and a flow value of tmax in C. This means that the weighted sum of the flow values at agents
i+ 1, . . . , n at circulation C is at most:
tmax ·
n∑
j=i+1
t2(n−j+1)max . (11)
Now, the value of the sum (11) is strictly lower than the right hand side of inequality (10). Conse-
quently, even in the extreme case when all agents with lower priorities than agent i have flow value
zero in C ′ and a flow value of tmax in C, it holds that w(C ′) > w(C). However, this contradicts that
C is a maximum weight circulation since C ′ is a feasible circulation at graph DR.
Appendix B.3: The Proof
Let ϕ be the priority mechanism based on pi where pi(i) = i for all i ∈ N . To obtain a contradiction,
suppose that ϕ can be manipulated by some agent i ∈ N at a profile R ∈ R˜. This means that there
are two profiles R ∈ R˜ and R′ = (R′i, R−i) ∈ R˜ such that for x = ϕ(R) and x′ = ϕ(R′) we have
x′iPixi. Note that R
′
i 6= Ri. Let C1 and C2 be the maximum weight circulations for the graphs DR
and DR′ induced by the profiles R and R′ = (R′i, R−i), respectively.
The next lemma shows that we may suppose that the set of acceptable agents reported by agent
i at preference relation R′i is a proper subset of the set of acceptable agents reported by agent i at
preference relation Ri.
Lemma 3. Without loss of generality, we may suppose Ai(R′i) ⊆ Ai(Ri).
Proof. We first show Ui(Ri) ⊆ Ui(R′i). To see this, suppose j ∈ Ui(Ri) but j /∈ Ui(R′i), i.e., that
agent j is unacceptable underRi but acceptable underR′i. Since x
′
iPixi, it must then hold that x
′
ij = 0
by definition of the preferences in R˜i. Hence, any regular arc of type (jout, iin) where j /∈ Ui(R′i)
in the graph DR′ but j ∈ Ui(Ri) in the graph DR will not be active in the solution C1 at profile R′.
Hence, Ui(Ri) ⊆ Ui(R′i) ∪ {j ∈ Ai(R′i) : x′i(n+j) = 0}.
But then we may choose R′′i such that Ai(R
′′
i ) = Ai(R
′
i)\{j ∈ Ai(R′i) : x′i(n+j) = 0} and
t¯′′ik = t¯
′
ik for all k ∈ Ai(R′′i ), and C1 remains a solution for R′′ = (R′′i , R−i) ∈ R˜. But for
x′′ = ϕ(R′′) this implies x′′i Iix
′
i and x
′′
i Pixi. Hence, Ai(R
′′
i ) ⊆ Ai(Ri) and x′′i Pixi.
Recall now that, for any profile in R ∈ R˜, each agent k ∈ N reports a set of acceptable agents
Ak(Rk) together with an upper bound t¯kj on the number of goods that agent k ∈ N at most would
34
like to receive from each acceptable agent j ∈ Ak(Rk). By Remark 1, the report Rk is equivalent to
the vector t¯k where t¯kk = tk and t¯kj = 0 for all j ∈ Uk(Rk). This, together with the conclusion in
Lemma 3, implies that there exists at least one agent j that is acceptable for agent i under Ri where
agent i reports a strictly lower or higher bound t¯′ij at profile R
′ than under profile R (i.e., t¯′ij < t¯ij
or t¯′ij > t¯ij ). In general, a manipulation R
′
i by agent i can consist of both underreporting and
overreporting t¯ij’s for acceptable agents. There are two possible cases for manipulations: one with
overreporting and the other with only underreporting bounds. We will first show that overreporting
any bound cannot be beneficial, and then we prove that no combination of underreporting bounds can
result in a better allocation either.
First, consider the case where there is overreporting. If there exists j ∈ N\{i} such that x′ij > t¯ij ,
then by definition of R˜i, ωiPix′i and since x is individually rational under R, we have xiPix′i, a
contradiction. Otherwise x′ij ≤ t¯ij for all j ∈ N\{i} and we can just replace t¯′i with t¯′′i such that
t¯′′ij = min{t¯ij , t¯′ij} for all j ∈ N\{i}. Let R′′i denote i’s preference associated with t¯′′i . Then x′ is still
a maximizer for the profile (R′′i , R−i) and therefore the manipulation only consists of underreporting
upperbounds which are below t¯i.
Second, it remains to establish that agent i cannot manipulate by underreporting the upper bounds
for acceptable agents, i.e., that t¯′ij ≤ t¯ij for all j ∈ N\{i}. Below we are going to show that
agent i cannot gain by underreporting one upper bound for an acceptable agent. This is enough to
establish that agent i never can gain by reporting a lower bound for several agents at the same time.
Because any such misreport can be decomposed into a sequence of manipulations in which at each
step only one upper bound t¯ij is changed at the time and agent i is never made better off at any
step. Formally, let k ∈ Ai(Ri) for which t¯′ik < t¯ik and consider the misreport t¯(1)i where t¯(1)ij = t¯ij
for all j 6= k and t¯(1)ik = t¯′ik. Let x(1) be the allocation chosen by the priority mechanism when i
reports t(1). Below we show that agent i cannot gain by reporting t¯(1)i instead of t¯i. In particular,∑
j∈Ai(Ri) xij ≥
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) x
(1)
ij . Thus, xiRix
(1)
i . If there is another agent ` 6= k such that t¯(1)i` 6= t¯′i`
then consider t¯(2) where t¯(2)ij = t¯
(1)
ij for all j 6= ` and t¯(2)i` = t¯′i`. Suppose again that agent i cannot
gain by reporting t¯(2)i instead of t¯
(1)
i . This means again that
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) x
(1)
ij ≥
∑
j∈Ai(Ri) x
(2)
ij . Thus,
by transitivity xiRix(2). This argument can be repeated inductively until the point that t¯
(p)
i = t¯
′
i, and
if in each step agent i never gains by reporting t¯(j)i instead of t¯
(j−1) we have shown that agent i cannot
gain by reporting t¯′i instead of t¯i. Hence, to complete the proof of Theorem 1, it is enough to show
that agent i cannot gain by misreporting t¯′ij for one agent j ∈ Ai(Ri).
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Thus, to prove non-manipulability of the priority mechanism, it only remains to rule out that
agent i cannot gain by reporting a strictly lower bound t¯ij . Translating this into the terminology of the
circulation-based model, this can equivalently be expressed as the flow valueC(iin, iout) at agent i in a
maximum weight circulation cannot be increased by reducing the capacity on a regular arc (jout, iin).
Given this insight, a large part of the remaining proof will focus on a regular arc (jout, iin).
Recall now that C1 denotes the maximum weight circulations for the true preferences R induced
by the graph DR, and that C2 denotes the maximum weight solution for the misrepresented pref-
erences R′ induced by the graph DR′ . Furthermore, by the assumption that agent i can manipu-
late the priority mechanism, it follows that C2 has a larger flow value at agent i than C1 does, i.e.,
C2(iin, iout) > C1(iin, iout). By construction of the weights in condition (9), the circulation value
of C2 cannot be the same as the circulation value of C1 if the flow value differs for at least one
agent. Thus, the circulation value of C2 must be strictly smaller than the circulation value of C1, i.e.,
w(C2) < w(C1). Note also that the circulation C2 is a feasible circulation in DR since the flows re-
main below the capacity on each arc, and it preserves flow conservation. However, the circulation C2
is not optimal in the graph DR since the circulation value of C2 is strictly smaller than the circulation
value of C1, and the circulation C1 is optimal in DR.
Consider next the function defined by the circulation C1 − C2 where C1(u, v) − C2(u, v) ∈ Z
for each arc (u, v) in the graph DR. This function assigns a negative value to the arc (u, v) if the flow
through the arc is larger in circulation C2 than in circulation C1. For convenience, one can think of
these “negative” arcs as arcs turned backwards, with the usual positive flow value on them. Since both
C1 and C2 are circulations in the graph DR, their difference also obeys flow conservation, and, as
such, it can be decomposed into cycles.
A cycle decomposition is a collection of directed cycles in the graph so that the flow value on all
edges of a specific cycle in the decomposition is the same, and the sum of flow values in all cycles
containing an arc (u, v) equals the flow value on (u, v). The capacity or the weight on the edges plays
no role in the decomposition. It is known that any feasible circulation has a cycle decomposition (Ford
and Fulkerson, 1956). In the next paragraph, we will construct such a cycle decomposition of the
circulation C1 − C2. For simplicity, we will decompose our circulation into cycles of flow value 1.
Note first that a cycle decomposition of C1 − C2 need not be unique for the profiles R and
R′. To obtain one such decomposition, we use a simple inductive algorithm that produces a cycle
decomposition of C1 − C2 in a finite number of iterations. This algorithm uses the flow value of
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C1 − C2 on each arc (u, v) in the graph DR but will not use any information about the arc capacities
or weights (arc weights are only considered below). First, identify any directed cycle, say C, based
on the circulation C1 − C2 and take its forward or backward arc with a lowest absolute flow value
on it. Suppose that the lowest absolute flow value at some agent in the cycle C is q, then q feasible
cycles of type C can be identified. These cycles represent the first q cycles in the decomposition of
C1 − C2. Then, reduce the flow value on each arc included in the cycle C by q. This will give an
“updated” circulation, based on the “original” circulationC1−C2. Notice that the updated circulation
is indeed a circulation, preserving flow conservation at each vertex, but, compared to C1 − C2, it is
guaranteed to have at least one more arc with zero flow value. We proceed in this manner until the
whole circulation C1−C2 is decomposed into cycles. Note also that, since N0 is restricted to a set of
positive bounded integers, this procedure ends in a finite number of iterations. Moreover, the absolute
flow value on an arc monotonically (but not strictly monotonically) decreases in each inductive step,
until it reaches 0.
Note that the cycles in the decomposition are not necessarily arc-disjoint from each other (i.e.,
several distinct cycles in the decomposition can pass through the same arc), but, due to the inductive
argument above, each arc in the cycle decomposition is either a forward arc or a backward arc, de-
pending on the sign ofC1(u, v)−C2(u, v). More precisely, forward arcs are positive, while backward
arcs are negative. Thus, it cannot be the case that one cycle in the decomposition uses an arc with
positive value, while another cycle uses the same arc with negative value.
Consider now the cycle decomposition of the circulation C1 − C2 as constructed above. We now
turn towards arc weights: the total weight of a cycle in the decomposition is defined as the sum of
weights on each arc in the cycle. Based on the sign of the total weight of a cycle, we distinguish
positive, zero and negative weight cycles in our decomposition. A positive weight cycle is called an
augmenting cycle. Note that all augmenting cycles pass through (jout, iin), because any augmenting
cycle which does not pass through (jout, iin) would increase the circulation value ofC2 inDR′ , which
is impossible since C2 is optimal in the graph DR′ .
Lemma 4. Suppose that C1−C2 is decomposed into cycles using the inductive decomposition algo-
rithm from above. Then:
(i) there exists an augmenting cycle,
(ii) a cycle of weight zero consists exclusively of arcs of weight zero,
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(iii) there are no negative weight cycles.
Proof. The proof of Part (i) follows directly since w(C1) > w(C2) and w(C1) equals w(C2) plus
the weight of each cycle in the cycle decomposition of C1 − C2. Part (ii) follows by construction
of the weights, i.e., a cycle of weight zero consists exclusively of arcs of weight zero (obviously, no
combination of the weights on inner arcs with coefficients in the open interval between 0 and tmax
can add up to zero).
Part (iii) is proved by contradiction. Suppose that there is a cycle C of negative total weight in the
cycle decomposition of C1 − C2. Let the reverse of C be denoted by
←
C . The reverse
←
C has positive
total weight and preserves the sign of C2 − C1 on each of its arcs by construction of the inductive
decomposition algorithm. Moreover, we will show that,
←
C can be added to C1 without violating flow
conservation or any capacity constraint in DR. Thus, C1 +
←
C is a circulation of larger weight than
C1. Let now (u, v) be an arbitrary arc in the reverse cycle
←
C . It will be demonstrated that:
0 ≤ C1(u, v) +
←
C (u, v) ≤ c(u, v). (12)
Condition (12) implies that C1 cannot be a maximum weight circulation in the graph DR which
contradicts our assumption. We need to consider two cases. Suppose first that
←
C (u, v) ≥ 0. Then:
C1(u, v) +
←
C (u, v) ≤ C1(u, v) + [C2(u, v)− C1(u, v)] = C2(u, v) ≤ c(u, v).
Note also that because C1(u, v) and
←
C (u, v) are non-negative at the arc (u, v), it follows directly
that C1(u, v) +
←
C (u, v) ≥ 0. Hence, condition (12) holds when
←
C (u, v) ≥ 0. Suppose next that
←
C (u, v) < 0. In this case:
C1(u, v) +
←
C (u, v) < C1(u, v) ≤ c(u, v).
Furthermore:
C1(u, v) +
←
C (u, v) ≥ C1(u, v) + [C2(u, v)− C1(u, v)] = C2(u, v) ≥ 0.
Hence, condition (12) also holds when
←
C (u, v) < 0.
Lemma 4 thus demonstrated that all cycles in the cycle decomposition ofC1−C2, which pass through
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an inner arc, are augmenting cycles. However, we do not know whether these cycles use the arc
(jout, iin) as a forward arc or as a backward arc. The following lemma sheds light on this.
Lemma 5. Suppose that C1−C2 is decomposed into cycles using the inductive decomposition algo-
rithm from above, and let (jout, iin) be an arbitrary arc in some cycle in the cycle decomposition of
C1 − C2. Then (jout, iin) is a forward arc.
Proof. Note first that C2(jout, iin) is bounded from above by the decreased capacity of (jout, iin) in
DR′ . IfC1(jout, iin) ≤ C2(jout, iin), thenC1 is feasible in the graphDR′ and has a larger weight than
C2, which contradicts the optimality of C2 in the graphDR′ . Thus, C1(jout, iin)−C2(jout, iin) > 0,
which implies that (jout, iin) is a forward arc in all cycles in the decomposition of C1 − C2.
Finally, consider the flow value C1(iin, iout) − C2(iin, iout). To prove Theorem 1, we only need to
establish that C1(iin, iout) − C2(iin, iout) ≥ 0 because this contradicts the assumption that x′iPixi.
For this condition to be false, the arc (iin, iout) must be a backward arc in at least one cycle in the cycle
decomposition of C1 − C2. However, as concluded above, being a backward arc in one cycle also
implies being a backward arc in all cycles. From Lemma 4 we know that all cycles that pass through
(iin, iout) are augmenting cycles. Lemma 5 then states that the augmenting cycles use (jout, iin) as a
forward arc, and they must, consequently, leave iin either as a forward arc, along the only outgoing
arc (iin, iout), or as a backward arc, along any of the regular arcs running to iin. Neither of these two
cases allows (iin, iout) to be a backward arc. This concludes the proof and shows that agent i cannot
manipulate the priority mechanism ϕ at any profile R ∈ R˜.
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